Metacognition & Hallucination

Investigating whether models know what they know, and why they confidently state things that are false.

The Problem

Large language models routinely produce confident, fluent, and completely false statements. This "hallucination" problem is closely tied to metacognition: a model's ability (or inability) to represent the limits of its own knowledge. A system that cannot tell what it doesn't know cannot reliably tell us either.

Key challenges include:

  • Miscalibrated confidence — Models often express the same certainty for correct and incorrect answers.
  • Absent self-knowledge — Models lack a reliable internal signal for "I don't know," making hallucination hard to prevent at the source.
  • Detection — Distinguishing a grounded answer from a fabricated one, from the outside, is an open problem.
  • Metacognition and safety — Genuine self-monitoring could improve honesty, but a model that models its own cognition also raises deeper safety questions.

What We're Working On

  • Metacognition in LLMs — Studying whether and how models represent the limits of their own knowledge.
  • Hallucination detection — Developing methods to flag fabricated or ungrounded outputs, including from a model's internal states.
  • Honesty and calibration — Improving how reliably a model's expressed confidence tracks the truth.

Related Publications

No publications in this area yet. Check back soon or view all research.